

Fiscal Year 2019 Report of June 5, 2019 Closed Meeting
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board
Under Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act

1. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) held a quarterly meeting in the Pentagon, Washington, DC on June 5, 2019 in Room 3E863.

2. A portion of the meeting was closed to the public from 8:55 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. The meeting was closed in accordance with provisions outlined by the Government in the Sunshine Act, as amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1) and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), as amended by 5 U.S.C. Appendix (Executive Order 13526 – Classified National Security Information). The agenda items covered during this period were the presentations from the Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command; the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness; and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Corporation. Secret level discussions are likely as they address military operations; the readiness, availability, use, and performance of the National Guard and Reserve; and future strategies for their use. The unclassified summary of each of the presentations is provided below:

a. Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command Remarks

VADM Michael J. Dumont, USN

- VADM Dumont talked about Northern Command's posture with the use of the National Guard and Reserve to achieve its national military strategy and homeland security requirements.
- VADM Dumont also discussed the changes in the National Security Environment describing the range and lethality of our adversaries. He linked how the Reserve Component was critical to support NORAD/NORTHCOM's span of operations and described the two command structures and their duty alignment.
- He described the Areas of Operations (AORs), and linked the possible threats in those AORs.
- VADM Dumont also elaborated on the integration with the whole of government to ensure synchronization in the defense of the homeland.
- VADM Dumont described how he views future Reserve Component utilization and provided thoughts on the related policy. He stated that he is seeking support in eliminating Service specific dedicated billets which rely wholly on a single Service's pipeline to provide the right talent and skills. His purpose in doing so is to ensure the most qualified individual, based on their knowledge and experience, is selected for a specific position. He proposed maintaining equity by keeping the same ratio of Active Duty and Reserve Components and keeping the current ratio of Service Component mix.
- He also stated that NORTHCOM would continue to seek Engineers and Cyber Capabilities from the RC as well as continue to leverage State Authorities to support upcoming elections.
- VADM Dumont articulated the Combatant Commands' difficulty experienced with predicting Guard and Reserve support and training availability due to the different processes in each of the services to obtain training days. He stated that standardization of training man-day processes and quantity would do much to reduce confusion, facilitate better planning, and ease the administrative burden in bringing in the Reserve Components for both training and operations.
- MG Cardwell added to this topic explaining that man-day allocation follows Service prerogative in current practice without priority assigned to Combatant Command requirements.

- VADM Dumont summarized his request to the Board for assistance on the following policy matters:
- More efficient processes to access 10 USC 12304a authority due to policy changes with the authorities used for immediate and emergency response.
- Advocacy for Joint Force Commanders' requirements when Services allocate Reserve Component man-day funding.
- Updating policy to include Combatant Command review of service program requests to validate that service resources address Combatant Command utilization of Reserve Component support.
- He then stressed that there is a critical need for participation in exercises to explore seams and gaps in Northern Command's plans.
- VADM Dumont also discussed the balance of border support to other missions and DHS's budgetary challenges.

b. Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Remarks

The Honorable David L. Norquist

- Secretary Norquist described the current strategic environment and the significant waypoints experienced by the Department since the drafting of the most recent National Defense Strategy. He highlighted the direct link between the National Defense Strategy and the FY20 Budget and then noted the major events associated with it: on-time enactment of the FY19 Budget; business reform progress; the adoption of data analytics in Department management; the Air Force's improvement in aircraft maintenance personnel; growth in Foreign Military Sales to facilitate interoperability with allies and partners; the increase in shipbuilding; and increased research and development spending.
- Secretary Norquist posed questions to the Board, seeking the members' advice on a vision for the Guard and Reserve that fits the transition described in the National Defense Strategy from a Post-9 11 counterterrorism model to interstate strategic competition as the primary U.S. national security concern.
- Secretary Norquist asked the Board if the current deployment rotation model is sustainable by the Guard and Reserve and what footing would be necessary to maximize preparedness for strategic mobilization in order to defeat a major power after two decades of counterterrorism operations. This preparedness must be better and the response quicker than the Cold War model.
- Secretary Norquist also observed the growth in CONUS-based missions (i.e. cyberspace, intelligence, space, and reconnaissance) and asked the Board's perspective on dwell policy for home-based operational utilization.
- MajGen (Ret) Punaro added to the CONUS-based mission topic, noting that it is something for the Board to take a hard look at.
- MG (Ret) Orr articulated a need for the Department to educate employers on the demands of CONUS-based missions and described that Iowa employers are currently supportive of the Iowa National Guard's high deployment tempo.
- MG Daniels described that the Department needs the Operational Reserve model for cohesion and retention since reservists join to "serve, go, train, and do." Mid-career reservists experience increased complexity in balancing the model with civilian life. MG Daniels added to Secretary Norquist's remark on the Cold War model, observing that in today's environment post-mobilization training must be more intensive and not take 9 months to accomplish.
- Maj Gen (Ret) Zuehlke commented on the need for a service member support structure for reach-back operations conducted by reservists from CONUS. Support increases the personal

resilience needed when home station reserve duties involve being a part of the kill chain for remote operations.

- Brig Gen Saxe identified that Air Force tanker utilization over a 1:5 dwell causes retention problems as the demand reduces individual flexibility for civilian employment. Brig Gen Saxe added that frequent operational rotations for this reason work against the ability to staff a fully mobilized force.
- RADML (Ret) Wackerman described the importance of predictability in Reserve Component utilization in response to Secretary Norquist's inquiry on the challenges to managing Reserve utilization.
- Secretary Stewart highlighted the direct link of predictability to an on-time Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) as a key piece that the DepSecDef can assist with to ensure the viability of the Department's Reserve Component utilization policy. The GFMAP has been late 2 years in a row with adverse impacts on service member benefits packages, access to TRICARE, and employer notification timelines. Signing the GFMAP by April 1st every year is essential to meeting the policy standard for a 180 day notice.
- MG Daniels described to Secretary Norquist how the Reserve Components were inherently disadvantaged by DoD policies, in that the Department usually designs policies, practices, and procedures for the Active Component or sometimes accomplishes that portion first. MG Daniels assessed that the Reserve Component aspects represented the more difficult portion of policy to address and that accomplishing that piece first would address most issues for the Total Force.
- Chairman Punaro outlined the major considerations for Secretary Norquist in response to his questions. The two major elements consist of: 1) A future model for operational reserve utilization and strategic reserve call-up to defeat a major power, and 2) Equipping the Reserve Components to defeat a major power. The Chairman added the Congress is extremely supportive of Reserve Component utilization and equipping while consistently expressing concern over them doing too much. For the equipment piece, the Department has really turned a corner for the worse with reserve equipping and he described seeing troubling signs of a gap that cannot be closed with the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account due to the sheer expense and lack of transparency in the Military Department's budgeting for Reserve equipment. Chairman Punaro described to Secretary Norquist that in order to implement the National Defense Strategy, the Reserve Components and Active Components must possess the same equipment, aircraft, logistics assets, and vehicles in order to achieve the interoperability expected in combat.
- Maj Gen Taheri articulated how Reserve Component force structure provides a risk handling strategy for the department in terms of the capacity needed in a major power war.
- Secretary Norquist agreed with the risk discussion and added that he considered the Reserve Component force structure matched to future capability modernization as a risk handling strategy that enables the Department to apply the consistent, multiyear investment needed to field a lethal force with decisive advantages as outlined in the National Defense Strategy. Secretary Norquist further explained that allocating resources to grow Active Component end strength is a risky bet, since Congress may decrease the size of the military in any 2-year time frame, having to let them go after expending effort on recruiting and training of those forces. Secretary Norquist then described that from this perspective, budgeting for investment and modernization while realizing the cost benefits of the Reserve Components provided the most consistent and durable way to implement the National Defense Strategy.
- Chairman Punaro connected the analytical decision making and resourcing of this investment approach to the Department's need to eliminate major gaps in DoD data when it comes to the fully-burdened and life-cycle cost of military personnel.

- The Chairman explained that the Department does not budget against the fully-burdened life cycle cost of manpower, which results in a budget that obscures the comparative cost advantage of the Reserve Components to the taxpayer. The RFPB previously recommended an approach to the SecDef that can enable more realistic manpower cost analysis in support of the DepSecDef, the Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Comptroller.
- Secretary Norquist agreed with the need for realistic manpower cost analysis that accounts for fully-burdened and life-cycle costs of military personnel, articulating that the Department is going to pay the bill whether it admits it or not. Secretary Norquist further explained this point, highlighting that the Department needs the right numbers for full costs in order to do long term strategy.
- Secretary Norquist recommended that Defense decision makers think about the Department as a balance sheet with assets and liabilities to demonstrate this point. In this case, the Department of Defense balance sheet contains \$2.7B in assets with less than \$1T in military hardware and \$1T in Treasury Bills earmarked to military pensions, compared with over \$2T in benefits liabilities. Secretary Norquist articulated the absence of balance sheet information in decision making results in missed opportunities when implementing the National Defense Strategy.
- Mr. Cancian asked Secretary Norquist if the National Defense Strategy defaults towards the Active Component in defeating a major power in a high end fight. Secretary Norquist believed the opposite, stating that although he didn't have the data, he believed the Reserve Components would comprise a significant part in any high end fight, noting that the National Defense Strategy instead highlights how to fight and invest in technology for the fully mobilized Joint Force, rather prescribing a specific force mix.

c. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness Remarks
Secretary James Stewart

- Secretary Stewart provided an update in his role of Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
- Secretary Stewart discussed possible incentives program, such as tax breaks, for employers who hire and employ RC service members. He also mentioned DOPMA and ROPMA, noting that some programs such as Career Intermission were authorized for the AC but not the RC, and stated that the RC also needs additional flexibility to aid in retention.
- He provided an update on Duty Status Reform, which is unlikely to make it into the NDAA due in part to the government shutdown, National Guard concerns with the Insurrection Act, late submission, and not scoring well with OMB because of the costing model timeframe that was used. He observed that the need for reform has been acknowledged for the last decade and that members of Congress have promised it would make it into the FY21 NDAA.
- Secretary Stewart then discussed the late submission of the GFMAP for the last two years, which is supposed to be completed by 1 April. A late submission can cause a lapse in Tricare coverage for Guard and Reserve service members. Some members of the Joint Staff believed the SDOB was sufficient, but Secretary Stewart highlighted the need for the GFMAP source document that contains the authority. The GFMAP also facilitates notification to ensure reservists and employers are not notified at the last minute, which negatively impacts retention as well as employer support. He discussed an ESGR study underway, noting that employers wanted communication and predictability.
- Secretary Stewart then discussed healthcare and stated 50-60% of his time Performing the Duties of USD P&R concerns healthcare management consolidation and implementation of

changes at the Defense Health Agency and in the services. His guiding principles are that we can't fail and must do no harm. The discussion then centered on RC units and personnel providing support to, and operating out of, MTFs. Congress has expressed concerns about the elimination of 18,000 AC health positions, but elimination of these positions can be justified based on the NDS, NMS, and OPLANS.

d. Institute for Defense Analyses Corporation Remarks

Mr. Joe Adams

- Mr. Adams briefed the findings of the OUSD (P&R)-sponsored study “Challenges to the Execution of Army National Guard (ARNG) and Marine Forces Reserve (MFR) Mission Essential Training.
- The study’s objective was to identify those distractors that significantly preclude Service Members from training on their core tasks and provide recommendations to alleviate or mitigate those distractions.
- The analysis identified distractors through observations and interviews with Army National Guard (ARNG) and Marine Forces Reserve (MFR) infantry, armor and UAS units from training on their core mission (Title 10) tasks.
- The study team offered recommendations to mitigate and reduce distractors, based on both historical best practices, and observed innovations along with their approximate costs to the extent possible.
- Mr. Adams described the study’s key research questions:
 - 1) What are the core tasks that armor, infantry and UAS units should prioritize to improve readiness levels and lethality?
 - 2) What are the types of distractors that impact core task training? (e.g. Administrative tasks/actions, information management, surveys/studies, logistics activities, borrowed military manpower)
 - 3) How much time do armor, infantry and UAS units spend on distractors? (Individuals, units)
 - 4) What are methods/approaches for mitigating or reducing distractors?
- He discussed the findings from Phase I of the study conducted across the Army Active Component, outlining specifics in the following major categories: manpower and duty requirements that consume training time, vehicle availability, and facility or resource limitations.
- Mr. Adams stated that these specifics drive interconnected challenges that compound impacts to readiness, and then portrayed an example of these cumulative impacts.
- He described Phase 2 of the study that focused on Army National Guard (ARNG) and Marine Forces Reserve (MFR) Engagements, noting the study team’s 2 major findings: 1) An operational reserve model challenged within a strategic reserve construct; 2) Active Component requirements and solutions levied on a total force without regard to RC realities.
- Mr. Adams described that these 2 major findings derived from training distractors driven by: IT policies and equipment, service mandatory training requirements, insufficient full time support personnel, service maintenance processes designed for Active Component availability, range and maneuver space constraints, the existing DoD approach to RC medical readiness, training allowance shortages, and facilities.
- As task lead, Mr. Adams offered the following recommendations:
 - 1) Amend the 30-day CAC/system login policy (consider changing to 60+ days); avoid system updates on weekends, especially the first weekend of each month.
 - 2) Provide non-.mil collaboration sites that would enable communications between leaders of both the AC and the RC.

- 3) Review and identify annual training requirements that can be achieved in one setting (i.e. initial entry); identify all that can be removed from RC annual requirements (i.e. one every two or three years, or upon promotion).
 - 4) Examine Full-Time Manning resources at Company/Battery levels for both ARNG and MFR units (with a focus on maintenance and tactical communications).
 - 5) Examine the assumptions associated with providing only some Marines with Individual Combat Equipment (ICE); Equip all Marines with ICE.
 - 6) Recognize and fund the requirements associated with Military Funeral Honors and Toys for Tots; consider public-private collaboration.
 - 7) Standardize firing range, maneuver space, and ammunition policies in order to increase regional RC opportunities for combined arms training.
 - 8) Co-locate UAS units with other aviation support facilities and evaluate Full-Time Manning allowances for UAS Platoons.
 - 9) Adopt dental treatment on site as a component of dental readiness processes.
- Chairman Punaro responded to the study's findings and recommendations by articulating the Board's support in addressing the problem areas and provided guidance for follow-on activity to the Board.
 - Chairman Punaro asked the RFPB subcommittees and Board members to work through the findings and recommendations, emphasize the full time support and legacy information technology problems, and look into conducting the study for the other Reserve Component Services.



Arnold L. Punaro
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Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board